This paper investigates mixed strategy equilibria in a capacity-constrained price competition among three firms. It is shown that the equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly are substantially different from those in a duopoly and symmetric oligopoly. In an asymmetric triopoly, it is possible that (i) a continuum of equilibria exists and that (ii) the lowest price of the smallest firm is higher than that of the others and the smallest firm earns more than the max-min profit in undominated strategies. In particular, the second finding sheds light on a new pricing incentive in Bertrand competitions. As an application, the equilibrium characterizations give rise to a new class of merger paradoxes.
Introduction
Since Levitan and Shubik's (1972) formal analysis of Edgeworth's classical idea, the capacity-constrained price competition model has been one of the basic models in the industrial organization literature. In particular, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Osborne and Pitchik (1986) fully characterize mixed strategy equilibria in a duopolistic homogeneous product market. They show that each firm earns the max-min payoff in undominated strategies (i.e., the payoff that the firm can reserve as long as the opponent takes an undominated strategy), and that the equilibrium strategies are simply the solution to the simultaneous equation system consisting of the equilibrium conditions with equalities. These results are so transparent and intuitive that one might expect that the properties of equilibrium in a duopoly can be extended to an oligopoly. The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate that this conjecture is not generally true.
The paper investigates mixed strategy equilibria in a capacity-constrained price competition among three firms and shows substantial differences between a duopoly and an asymmetric oligopoly. The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, while the equilibrium is always unique in a duopoly, a continuum of equilibria may exist in a triopoly. Second, even if the equilibrium is unique, in a triopoly, it is possible that the lowest price charged by the smallest firm is higher than that charged by the others and that the smallest firm earns more than the max-min profit in undominated strategies. In such a case, the smallest firm earns the highest profit per capacity. This also contrasts with the duopoly in which the supports of price distributions are the same across firms and both firms earn the max-min payoffs in undominated strategies. The first result, a continuum of equilibria, arises when the largest firm has a sufficiently large capacity. In such a case, other firms can sell as much as their entire capacities if their prices are lower than the largest firm's, and nothing otherwise. Owing to this, their expected profits depend only on the largest firm's strategy, and the equilibrium conditions for the two smaller firms can be reduced to only one condition. Then, the system of equilibrium conditions has a degree of freedom, which leads to a continuum of equilibria. The second result appears when the smallest firm is sufficiently small, and the intuition behind it sheds new light on incentives in price competitions. Even if a small firm charges the lowest price and is the first to serve, it can only sell as much as is its capacity. Thus, it has a larger incentive than the middle-sized firm to set a high price despite the fact that a high price raises the probability of its being undercut. Under a certain set of parameter values, this "small capacity effect" raises the smallest firm's minimal price and profit.
As an application, the second finding gives rise to a new type of merger paradox, i.e., a merger that is harmful to the insiders. Although the possibility of the merger paradox itself has been well known since the classic paper by Salant et al. (1983) , the paradox in the present paper should be distinguished from the paradoxes in existing models. First, the present model is of price competition and thus, of strategic complements, while the existing paradoxes are found in models of quantity competition and strategic substitutes. In fact, Davidson and Deneckere (1985) show that any coalition benefits both the insiders and outsiders in a price competition with differentiated products. Second, while a merger harmful to the insiders is beneficial to the outsiders in existing models, this is not the case in the present study. The finding in this paper can thus be regarded as a novel class of merger paradoxes.
The present paper is the first attempt to characterize the equilibrium payoffs and behaviors of all firms in a finite and asymmetric oligopoly.
1 Although there exist a number of papers subsequent to Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Osborne and Pitchik (1986) , they all have crucial additional assumptions that restrict their scope. Brock and Scheinkman (1985) consider a repeated price game in a general n firm oligopoly and specify the equilibrium payoffs in the stage game (i.e., one-shot price game), but they assume that all firms have an identical capacity. Vives (1986) proves that the support of equilibrium prices converges to the competitive price, but he also assumes symmetric capacity and takes the limit of the number of firms to infinity. Boccard and Wauthy (2000) and De Francesco (2003) consider a two-stage game à la Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) with a general number of asymmetric firms, but they examine only the largest firm's payoff and incentive in the price competition stage.
2
It should be noted that the findings in this paper are parallel to those in another class of models of price competition: price dispersion models à la Varian (1980). 3 In the literature, it is known that there exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria when the number of the firms is greater than two (Baye et al., 1992) , and that the smallest firm may earn the largest profit per loyal segment in an asymmetric oligopoly (Kocas and Kiyak, 2006) . However, it should also be noted that the logic behind these results is different from the present model. First, the cause of the continuum of equilibria is the fact that a firm's demand depends only on whether its price is the lowest. Second, the smallest firm earns a relatively higher profit because it has the largest incentive to discount but does not need to do so in an equilibrium. Furthermore, in the price dispersion model, firms always earn the max-min profit in undominated strategies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and introduces notations. Section 3 provides the characterizations of equilibria and Section 4 presents the analysis of horizontal mergers. Section 5 concludes. Appendices A-C contain proofs of the equilibrium characterizations (Claims 1-6), generalizations of the small capacity effect, and an example of multiple equilibria, respectively.
Namely, π
When there exists a pure strategy equilibrium, its properties are almost the same as those in a duopoly and symmetric oligopoly. That is, a pure strategy equilibrium exists if and only if the largest firm has no incentive to raise its price from the competitive price, i.e., p
, and the market demand is fully met at that price. Since the main objective of this paper is to point out the substantial differences between a duopoly and an asymmetric oligopoly, another assumption is made to rule out the pure strategy equilibrium.
Notice that K < D(0) is neither necessary nor sufficient for Assumption 3. When K > D(0), a pure strategy equilibrium exists if and only if
Even when no pure strategy equilibrium exists, the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium is guaranteed by Theorem 5 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) . Let (F 1 (·), F 2 (·), F 3 (·)) denote an equilibrium triple of mixed strategies (i.e., distribution functions on R + ) and define a i = inf supp F i and b i = sup supp F i . Throughout the paper, π i (p; F −i ) denotes i's expected profit when it sets a price p, given the opponents' mixed strategies. That is,
Notice that even if π i (p; F −i ) is not continuous, the left and right limits always exist. Finally, let π * i denote i's equilibrium payoff. In a duopoly, Osborne and Pitchik (1986) show that (i) the equilibrium is unique, (ii) the equilibrium payoffs are given by (π duopoly, for all p ∈ [a * , b * ), (F 1 (p), F 2 (p)) is the unique solution to the simultaneous equation system π i (p; F j ) = π * i for each i ∈ {1, 2}. It might seem natural to expect that the number of firms only affects the number of equations and variables. In the next section, however, it is shown that the equilibrium in a triopoly may have properties different from those in a duopoly.
Mixed Strategy Equilibria
In this section, we characterize the mixed strategy equilibria in the market described above. To begin with, we consider the following claim that holds true both in a duopoly and an oligopoly. It is a standard property of the Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium, which has already been established in the literature.
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Claim 1. In any equilibrium, there exists i ∈ arg min j a j ∩ arg max j b j such that (i)
The logic behind Claim 1 can be summarized as follows. There must exist i ∈ arg max j b j such that max j i p j < b i with probability one, since it is obvious that in an equilibrium, at most one firm charges max j b j with a positive probability. Then, it directly follows from the equilibrium condition that π * i = π Notice that Claim 1 does not exclude the possibility of an equilibrium in which not firm 1 but i satisfies the conditions (i-iii) when K 1 = K i . 7 However, in such a case, there must also exist an equilibrium in which firm 1 (but not i) satisfies those conditions. Thus, we can assume that a 1 = a Osborne and Pitchik (1986) for a duopoly and Boccard and Wauthy (2000) and De Francesco (2003) for an oligopoly.
7 DS (Proposition 1) state without a proof that such an asymmetric equilibrium never exists under an arbitrary number of firms. 8 In the first version of the paper (Hirata, 2008 ) the discussions on the boundary cases in which D(a * ) = K 12 and D(a * ) = K 13 were incomplete, while DS properly address these issues. 
D(a
The reason that a continuum of equilibria exists is as follows. When K 1 is sufficiently large, firm i 1 can fully supply its entire capacity if
, which is independent of the relation p 2 p 3 . Then, the equilibrium conditions for firms 2 and 3 are reduced to only one condition, because π *
The number of variables exceeds the number of conditions and hence, we can construct a continuum of equilibria. Note that exactly the same logic will hold even if there are more than three firms. In general, when n ≥ 3 firms with
Notice also that in this case, we can construct an equilibrium so that the supports of F i 's are heterogeneous. See Appendix C for an example.
As mentioned in the introduction, Baye et al. (1992) show that there also exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria in the price dispersion model if more than two firms operate in a market. Although this seems similar to Claim 2, the logic behind it is different. In the price dispersion model, each firm's demand depends only on whether its price is the lowest. Thus, a firm's payoff does not depend on the distributions of other firms' prices but only on the distribution of the minimum of their prices. This gives rise to the continuum of (asymmetric) equilibria. Moreover, asymmetry of support appears in the price dispersion model only because of the degree of freedom of equilibrium conditions, whereas it appears in the present model even if the degree of freedom does not exist.
9 See Claims 4 and 5 below.
The second case is the one where K 1 , K 2 , and K 3 are relatively close to one another. The symmetric capacity case, in which K 1 = K 2 = K 3 , must be included here.
and thus, there is no continuum of equilibria.
, it is obvious that a 2 = a 3 = a * is necessary to control firm 1's incentive to raise its price from a * . Even though D(a * ) = K 12 , a 3 > a * yields a technical contradiction under Assumptions 1-2. This result is also extendable. When there are n firms with
Case 3: when
In the next case, K 3 is very small relative to K 1 and K 2 . The following claim highlights the second finding explained in the introduction. The possibility of π * 3 /K 3 > π * 2 /K 2 in the following claim (and in Claim 5 below) is the cause of the merger paradox in Section 4.
Note that we cannot take a continuum of equilibria even if D(b
. The reason why a 3 > a 2 = a * holds in Claim 4 is roughly as follows. The smallest firm 3 has a larger incentive to deviate from a * and raise its price than the middle-sized firm 2, while at least one of the two firms must charge the price (in a right-neighborhood of) a * in order to control the largest firm 1's incentive. For simplicity, suppose that (F 1 , F 2 , F 3 ) is a profile of mixed strategies such that for all i ∈ N, F i is differentiable on a right-neighborhood of a * and F i (a * ) = 0. Then, let us consider the marginal change in profit of firm i ∈ {2, 3} when it raises its price from a * : i.e., dπ i (p;
is the expectation of i's supply with respect to F −i , and thus that dπ i (p;
The first and second terms represent the positive and negative effects of the raise in price, respectively. 10 The first version of the paper (Hirata, 2008) overlooked the fact that a continuum of equilibria exists if D(b * ) < K 1 , while DS correctly state this.
On the one hand, the positive effect at p = a * is K i · d p, which is proportional to the capacity. On the other hand, the negative effect is not proportional to K i . Indeed, on a neighborhood of a * ,
where j ∈ {2, 3} \ {i}. The first, second, and third terms represent the demand when p i < p 1 , p 1 < p i < p j , and max{p 1 , p j } < p i , respectively. 11 Note also that F 1 F j is the second order and thus, we can neglect it on a neighborhood of a * . Therefore, the marginal change in the expected supply is given by
It should be noted that the residual demand, D(a
Thus, for any fixed F 1 , it follows that
That is, the loss of deviating from a * is larger even per capacity for firm 2 than it is for firm 3. Inequalities (1) and (2) represent what is called the small capacity effect in the present paper.
Combining these discussions, we can conclude that the smallest firm 3 generally has a stronger incentive to raise its price from a * than firm 2. In particular, when (1) and (2) strictly hold because
Thus, no F 1 can provide the incentive to charge prices in a neighborhood of a * to both firms 2 and 3. Since a 2 = a * is necessary to control firm 1's incentive, it follows that a 3 > a 2 = a * in an equilibrium. Once it is shown that a 3 > a 2 in the equilibrium, it directly follows that π * 3 /K 3 > π * 2 /K 2 . Compare π 2 (p; F −2 ) and π 3 (p; F −3 ) on a right neighborhood of a * . Charging p, firm 3 gets more demand per capacity than firm 2 with probability F 1 (1 − F 2 ) and possibly less with probability F 1 F 2 . Since F 1 , F 2 0 as p a * , the former 11 Recall that p i > p j does not matter as long as
difference vanishes faster than the latter. Thus, at least on a neighborhood of a * , π 3 (p; F −3 )/K 3 is greater than π 2 (p; F −2 )/K 2 , which implies that π * 3 /K 3 > π * 2 /K 2 . This small capacity effect can never appear in a duopoly, because the smaller firm's behavior is solely determined by the equilibrium condition for the larger firm. In other words, when K 13 ≤ D(a * ) < K 12 in a triopoly, only firm 2 charges very low prices in order to control firm 1's incentive and firm 3 free-rides on firm 2.
The logic behind Claim 4 is partially extendable. Suppose that there are firms 1, . . . , n with K 1 ≥ · · · ≥ K n in a market and there is no pure strategy equilibrium. Then, it is shown that
* } is non-empty and i ∈ arg max j∈A a j , then K i = K n . See Claims 7 and 8 in Appendix B.
The small capacity effect differs from the logic behind Kocas and Kiyak's (2006) result, even though they also show that the smallest firm may earn a relatively higher profit than the others. In their price dispersion model, the smallest firm has the largest incentive to discount, since it cannot sell much unless it captures the nonloyal segment of consumers. However, larger firms do not have as much of an incentive to discount and thus, the smallest firm does not need to discount as much as it would if it needed to. That is, in the price dispersion model, the reason that the smallest firm earns the highest profit per loyal segment is that the smallest firm has the largest incentive to discount but does not need to do so. On the contrary, in the present model, the smallest firm has the strongest incentive to charge a high price and it actually does so. Notice also that in Claim 4, the smallest firm earns more than its max-min profit in undominated strategies, whereas all the firms always get the max-min profit in the price dispersion model.
The last case we have to examine is the intermediate case between Cases 1 and 3. The following claims might seem complicated, but the logic behind them is just a combination of Claims 2 and 4.
In the latter case, there exists a continuum of equilibrium if 
Horizontal Mergers
In this section, the consequences of mergers in the present market are examined. In the present model, a merger can be formulated as follows. When firms i and j merge, they behave as one firm that has the capacity K i + K j . In other words, it is assumed that firms i and j want to maximize their joint profit but must charge the same price with probability one after they merge.
12 Let us call a coalition harmful (resp. beneficial) to the insiders if their joint profit after the merger is smaller (resp. greater) than that before the merger. The definitions of harm and benefit for the outsider are similar.
First, as a benchmark, the following proposition summarizes the consequences of mergers when a pure strategy equilibrium exists before a merger. In such a case, it is clear that any coalition cannot be harmful. 
where K o is the capacity of the outsider firm.
Proof. Suppose that two firms i and j merge and let o ∈ N \ {i, j} denote the outsider. Notice that in the pure strategy equilibrium before the merger, each firm earns the competitive price D −1 (min{K, D(0)}) times its capacity. It is obvious that there remains a pure strategy equilibrium after the merger if and only if arg max
In such a case, the market price is equal to the competitive price even after the merger and thus, all firms earn the same profit as before the merger. On the contrary, if arg max
the equilibrium after the merger must be in (non-degenerate) mixed strategies. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, each firm earns p m i j times its capacity, where p m i j is the minimal solution to the equation
and is strictly greater than the competitive price. That is, all firms earn greater equilibrium profits after the merger than before.
In a pure strategy equilibrium, the firms charge the competitive price and thus, they earn only the competitive profits. Therefore, any merger can harm neither the insiders nor the outsider. This result is extendable to a general number of firms. That is, if a pure strategy equilibrium exists before the merger, any coalition will harm neither the insiders nor the outsider(s) and will benefit all firms if and only if no pure strategy equilibrium exists after the merger.
On the contrary, when there is no pure strategy equilibrium before a merger, a merger paradox arises as a direct consequence of the characterizations in the previous section.
Proposition 2. When there exists no pure strategy equilibrium, i.e., when Assumption 3 holds in addition to Assumptions 1-2, a coalition that harms the insiders and does not benefit the outsider may occur.
Proof. Suppose that K 13 ≤ D(a * ) < K 12 and K 23 < K 1 before a merger and that firms 2 and 3 merge. Then, firm 1 remains to be the largest even after the merger, and p In Case 3 (when K 13 ≤ D(a * ) < K 12 ), the smallest firm earns a relatively high profit by free-riding on firm 2. If firms 2 and 3 merge in this situation, the merged firm can no longer free-ride and thus, the coalition will be harmful to the insiders.
As mentioned in the introduction, Proposition 2 is different from the existing merger paradoxes in two respects. First, the present model is a price game (strategic complements), while the existing models are quantity games (strategic substitutes). Second, a merger harmful to the insiders can be non-beneficial even to the outsider in my model, whereas it benefits the outsider(s) in the existing models. 13 
Conclusion
This paper investigates a capacity constraint model of price competition in a triopolistic homogeneous product market. The results demonstrate the divergences between a duopoly and an asymmetric oligopoly. It is shown that there exist the possibilities of (i) the existence of a continuum of (asymmetric) equilibria, and (ii) the smallest firm having the highest infimum of equilibrium price and earning beyond the max-min payoff in undominated strategies. While both of these possibilities cannot arise in a duopoly, the latter in particular sheds new light on the pricing incentives in price competitions. The first possibility is extendable to a general number of firms. The second possibility is hard to fully extend, but is partially extendable and provides a general insight into oligopolies. It remains for future research to explore a new logic toward characterizing the equilibria in a more general setting.
As an application, the second possibility leads to a new class of merger paradoxes. It implies that a horizontal merger in the present setting can be harmful to the insiders. This paradox is new in the following two respects. First, the present model is of price competition and strategic complements. Second, a harmful merger in the present model is non-beneficial to the outsider. Moreover, it can also be practically attractive. It might seem likely that a firm competing with the leading firm in an industry considers merging with a small firm achieving a relatively high performance. However, the present study predicts that such a merger can be harmful.
A Proofs of Claims 1-6
To begin with, recall that the Nash equilibrium conditions for a mixed strategy equilibrium can be written as
and
where µ i is the probability measure induced from F i . Note that if F i is rightincreasing (resp. left-increasing) at p, there must exist a sequence (p m ) m∈N such that p m p (resp. p m p) and π i (p m ;
14 Recall also that π i (p; F −i ) always has one-sided limits, because F j always has one-sided limits. Before presenting the proofs of the claims, we show the following four lemmata.
Proof. Suppose that i ∈ arg min j a j . To begin with, we show that π i (a i ; F −i ) = π * i . If a i is a mass point of F i , then the equilibrium conditions (EQ1) and (EQ2) directly imply the equation. If not, then F i must be right-increasing at a i by definition. On one hand, for any > 0 there exists p ∈ (a i , a i + ) such that π i (p;
If the inequality is strict, however, i has an incentive to charge p i = a i − with probability one since lim p a i π i (p; F −i ) = a i min{D(a i ), K i }, which is a contradiction to the equilibrium condition (EQ1). Thus, i ∈ arg min j a j implies that π * i = a i min{D(a i ), K i }. Proof. First, suppose that there exists i such that {i} = arg max j b j . If b i is a mass point of F i , the equilibrium conditions (EQ1) and (EQ2) directly imply
If b i is not a mass point of (3) Proof. Suppose that there exists j such that a j < a i . Since
That is, firm j does not have an incentive to set p ∈ [0, a i ), which is a contradiction to the assumption that a j < a i .
recalling that a i ≤ a 1 by Lemma 2.2, a i = a 1 must hold. This is because otherwise 15 Suppose, on the contrary, that b is a mass point of F i and F j with i j. By (EQ1) and (EQ2), it follows that π * i = π i (b; F −i ). Recalling that Assumption 3 implies D(b) < K, however, a contradiction that firm i has an incentive to lower its price: i.e., lim p b π i (p;
1 ) is strictly dominated by p i = a 1 . Notice also that by Lemmata 1 and 2.2,
which is a contradiction to the equilibrium condition (EQ1).
Claim 1 directly follows from these lemmata.
Proof of Claim 1. By Lemmata 2.1-2.3, we know that there exists i ∈ arg min j a j ∩ arg max j b j such that The following lemma is a direct consequence of Assumptions 1-3.
Lemma 3. In any equilibrium, F 1 is continuous on
and thus F i cannot be right-increasing atp. However, it implies that π 1 (p; F −1 ) is right-increasing atp because of Assumptions 1-2, which is a contradiction. Now, we are ready to prove the remaining claims.
Proof of Claim 2. First, we show how to construct a continuum of equilibria in which (π * 2 , π *
which depends only on F 1 . Hence, taking
and F 1 (b * ) = 1, the equilibrium conditions for firms 2 and 3 are satisfied. Any pair of F 2 and F 3 that satisfies π 1 (p;
forms an equilibrium. Since only one condition is imposed on two variables, we can take a continuum of (F 2 (·), F 3 (·)).
Next, we prove that there is no other equilibrium. Recall that there must exist i with a i = a * and
to satisfy (EQ1) for that i. By way of contradiction, suppose that there existsp ∈ (a * , b * ) such that F 1 (p) > 1 − (a * /p). Then, since F 1 must be continuous on [a * , b * ) by Lemma 3, we can take suchp so that F 1 is right-increasing atp. Notice that F 1 (p) > 1−(a * /p) implies that π i (p; F −i ) < a * K i for i 1 on a right-neighborhood ofp. That is, F 2 and F 3 must be constant on a right-neighborhood ofp. However, by Assumptions 1-2, it follows that π 1 (p; F −1 ) is right-increasing atp, a contradiction to the supposition that F 1 is right-increasing atp.
Proof of Claim 3. To begin with, we show that a 2 = a 3 = a * when K 12 ≤ D(a * ). The only non-trivial case we have to dismiss is a 3 > a 2 = a * under D(a * ) = K 12 . In such a case, F 2 must be right-increasing at a * , since firm 1 has an incentive to raise its price by Assumptions 1-3 otherwise. 16 Then, there must exist a sequence (p m ) m∈N with p m a * such that for all m ∈ N,
Thus, the L'Hospital rule yields
.
. That is,π 2 represents firm 2's expected profit when F 1 is constant on a right neighborhood of a * . Then, recalling the assumption that D(a
where the last inequality holds because D ≤ 0 by Assumption 2. Therefore, any non-decreasing F 1 with lim p a * F 1 = F * 1 implies that π 2 (p; F −2 ) is right-decreasing at a * , which is a contradiction. Thus, if
) has a degree of freedom on (D −1 (K 1 ), b * ) by the same reason as in Claim 2.
Proof of Claim 4. Notice that a 2 = a * must be satisfied in any equilibrium so that firm 1 does not strictly prefer setting p 1 = a * + to a * . 17 By Lemma 1, it follows that π * 2 = a * K 2 . Notice also that F 1 (a 
Manipulating this, we obtain
However, since
which is a contradiction to the definition of a distribution function. Therefore, we can conclude that a 3 > a * or F 3 is not right-increasing at a * . Next, suppose that a 3 > a * and π * 3 = a * K 3 . Since F 1 and F 2 must be rightincreasing at a * , for any > 0, there must exist p, p ∈ (a * , a * + ) such that π 1 (p; F −1 )/K 1 = π 2 (p ; F −2 )/K 2 = a * . Solving these and taking the limit, it follows that as p a * ,
Now, consider firm 3's incentive. Since D(a * ) > K 13 , for a sufficiently small > 0 and p ∈ (a * , a * + ), it follows that D(p) > K 13 ≥ K 23 and thus,
Therefore, the equilibrium condition (EQ1) implies that
However, it cannot hold on a right neighborhood of a * , because (4) implies that as p a * ,
That is, if a 3 > a * and π * 3 = a * K 3 , firm 3 has an incentive to set a price lower than a 3 , which is a contradiction. Thus, a 3 > a * and π * 3 > a * K 3 , or a 3 = a * and F 3 is not right-increasing at a * . If a 3 = a * and F 3 is not right-increasing at a * , a similar contradiction occurs; i.e., firm 3 has a strict incentive to set a higher price than a 3 = a * . This is because F 1 and F 2 are bound to be smaller than the above specification. As a conclusion, we have shown that a 3 > a * and π *
Proof of Claim 5. First, it is demonstrated that a 2 > a * or a 3 > a * in any equilibrium. By way of contradiction, suppose a 2 = a 3 = a * . Notice that a * cannot be a mass point of any F i . As in the proof of Claim 4, for any > 0, there exist p, p ∈ (a * , a * + ),
The second equation implies that as p a
Then, however, the first equation yields the following contradiction that as p a * ,
where the last inequality holds because of the assumption that K 2 > K 3 . Thus, a 2 = a 3 = a * cannot be satisfied in an equilibrium. Second, we show that D(a 2 ) ≤ K 1 if a 2 > a 3 = a * . Suppose that a 2 > a * . Then, a 3 = a * and π * 3 = a * K 3 must be satisfied. By way of contradiction, suppose also that D(a 2 ) > K 1 . The equilibrium condition (EQ1) for firm 3 implies that lim p a 2 π 3 (p; F −3 ) ≤ π * 3 , which is equivalent to
Since K 2 > K 3 by assumption, however, this inequality implies that
That is, firm 2 has a strict incentive to set a * (or slightly below), which is a contradiction. Therefore, D(a 2 ) ≤ K 1 if a 2 > a * in an equilibrium. Then, it follows that π * 2 = a * K 2 because firm 3 has an incentive to deviate if π * 2 > a * K 2 . On one hand, it is obvious that we can construct an equilibrium in which a 2 > a 3 = a
Furthermore, if the first inequality is strict, we can construct a continuum of equilibria in the same way as Claim 2. On the other hand, it is also obvious that there exists no equilibrium such that a 2 > a 3 = a
In such cases, an equilibrium must exist in which a 3 > a 2 = a * . Next, we show that π *
In the same manner as in the proof of Claim 3, suppose that a 3 > a 2 = a * and π * 3 = a * K 3 . Solving the equilibrium condition (EQ1) for firm 3,
≤ a * p must hold for p ∈ (a * , a * + ). Manipulating this, we obtain
However, in the same manner as in Claim 4, as p a * ,
which is a contradiction.
there exists no pure strategy equilibrium. Then, the logic of Claim 4 can be partially extended as follows. Proof. Suppose that D −1 (K 1 ) > a i > a j and K i ≥ K j . Let S := P(N \ {i, j}) \ ∅, where P(S ) denotes the power set of S for a given set S . Define K S := ∑ s∈S K s for S ∈ S, and let Notice that ∆ j − (K j /K i )∆ i is non-negative and non-decreasing in p under the supposition that K i ≥ K j . It directly follows by definition that
and π j (a j ; F −i ) = a j ∆ j (a j ).
Since π i (a i ; F −i ) = π * i , it must be that π i (a i ; F −i ) ≥ π i (a j ; F −i ) and thus a i ∆ i (a i ) > a j ∆ i (a j ). However, then, it follows that π j (a i ; F − j ) > π j (a i ; F − j ) = π * j , which is a contradiction. Proof. By Claim 7, we only have to exclude the case in which K i > K n and a n > D −1 (K 1 ) > a i . 20 It is obvious that π * n = a * K n if a n > D −1 (K 1 ), and that π i (a i ; F −i ) = π * i ≥ a * K i . Then, however, a contradiction occurs that
, where ∆ i and ∆ n are similarly defined as above. 20 If K i > K n and a i = a n ∈ (a * , D −1 (K 1 )), we can derive a contradiction in the same way as in the proof of Claim 7. 
, and (7)
forms an equilibrium. For another example, the same F 1 as above and F 2 = F 3 = F form another equilibrium, where
i.e., the solution to the equilibrium condition for firm 1,
The graphs of (F 1 , F 2 , F 3 ) in the two equilibria are shown in Figure 1 .
